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The implementation of usable security is particularly challenging 
in the growing field of Grid computing, where control is 
decentralised, systems are heterogeneous, and authorization 
applies across administrative domains. PERMIS, based on the 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model, provides a unified, 
scalable infrastructure to address these challenges. Previous 
research has found that resource owners generally do not 
understand the PERMIS RBAC model and consequently have 
difficulty expressing access control policies. We have addressed 
this issue by investigating the use of a controlled natural language 
parser for expressing these policies. In this paper, we describe our 
experiences in the design, implementation, and evaluation of this 
parser for the PERMIS Editor. We began by understanding the 
ways in which non-security specialists express their Grid access 
control needs, through interviews and focus groups with 45 
resource owners. We found that the many areas of Grid 
computing use present varied security requirements; this suggests 
a minimal, open design. We designed and implemented a 
controlled natural language system to support these needs, which 
we evaluated with a cross-section of 17 target users. We found 
that the interface is highly usable for interaction: participants 
were not daunted by the text editor, and understood the syntax 
easily. However, some strict requirements of the controlled 
language were problematic. Using natural language helps 
overcome some conceptual mis-matches between PERMIS RBAC 
and older paradigms; however, there are still subtleties which are 
not always understood. In conclusion, the parser is not sufficient 
on its own, and should be seen in the interplay with other parts of 
the PERMIS Editor, so that, iteratively, users are helped to 
understand the underlying PERMIS model and to express their 
security policies more accurately and more completely. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It should be indisputable that security and usability must co-exist. 
As long ago as 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder [22] promoted the 
principle of psychological acceptability of security mechanisms: 
protection mechanisms must be easily applicable by their target 
users. Security which is not usable is likely to lead to errors [24] 
and the creation of workarounds [1], and ultimately to a reduction 
in security. 
The arguments for usable security mechanisms are well-known 
even if they are not always easy to put into practice. This paper 
presents an effort to improve usability of a tool for a fundamental 
aspect of security – access control. Controlling access to 
resources is one of the most effective security measures, but is 
currently often given a low priority by resource owners because 
of the difficulties they find in using existing authorization 
methods [3]. The challenge, then, is to produce interfaces to 
access control tools that are accessible, and to enable resource 
owners to correctly set controls that reflect their security needs. 
PERMIS [9] offers a basis for achieving usable access control. In 
essence, PERMIS is an integrated,  Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) [23] infrastructure which provides all the necessary 
facilities for resource owners to manage authorization policies, 
and for these policies to be implemented in e-Science 
applications. 
Recognising the inherent difficulties in setting access control 
policies, PERMIS provides a Policy Editor with several 
complementary interfaces. The earliest interface was a Graphical 
User Interface (GUI), with tabs and drop-down menus. Later, a 
wizard for creating new policies and a policy tester were added. 
These interfaces successfully reduce the burden of maintenance of 
large and complex policies, but a vital aspect of policy 
specification is to ensure that the resource owner avoids mistakes 
arising from basic misconceptions [8]. To some extent, this need 
can be met by matching the language of the Editor to that of the 
target users [18]; earlier work using Conceptual Design enhanced 
its usability of the GUI [5]. However, we also realised that 
although careful design of an interface can help resource owners 
to understand what has to be done to write access control policies, 
they still have to work out how to state those policies correctly. 
The new PERMIS user interface presented in this paper takes a 
different approach: it uses controlled natural language to reduce 
the “distance” [19] between resource owners’ familiar, real-world 
access control needs and their expression in computer terms. This 
is not a replacement for the older interfaces, but is complementary 
to them. It aims to “match the users’ world” [18], not by 
incorporating their language into an interface which still reflects 
 
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or 
hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is 
granted without fee.  
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 2008, July 23-25, 
2008, Pittsburgh, PA, USA. 
the underlying computer logic, but more fundamentally, by 
enabling resource owners to express policies in their own natural 
ways of thinking. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
reviews previous research in usable security policy specification 
and identifies key issues in Grid and RBAC authorization. Section 
3 describes the first phase of our work to address these issues, in 
which we gained an understanding of the ways in which resource 
owners express their access control needs, and used these findings 
in the design of a controlled natural language interface. We 
evaluated the usability of our interface in scenario-based 
observations as detailed in section 4. In section 5, we relate our 
results from this evaluation to the key issues identified in section 
2. We conclude by considering ways in which usability of our 
interface might be improved and give brief pointers for future 
work. 
2. BACKGROUND: FROM USER VALUES 
TO ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES  
The overall problem which this paper addresses is that it is often 
difficult for resource owners to bridge the gap between their 
security needs, which might be understood in quite general terms, 
and the expression of those needs in concrete, computer terms 
[14]. This problem has been addressed by the usable security 
research community over the past 10 years; in this section we 
review the key previous work. 
The application domain and target user community for our work 
was Grid computing; we address problems which have been found 
in the specification of Grid authorization policies [5]. We 
consider ways in which resource owners’ natural expertise can be 
engaged, and we show that controlled natural language has been 
used in similar areas and is a good candidate to enable the 
expression of access control policies in an intuitive way. 
We conclude our review of the background to our research by 
identifying the usability challenges of policy specification in our 
underlying PERMIS RBAC authorization model. 
2.1 What the Resource Owner Intends 
It is important to clarify the direct, but often obscure, path from 
the intentions of resource owners through to low-level actions by 
IT systems. 
Resource owners (including developers, system administrators, 
end users, and others) generally have good knowledge of the 
assets under their control and of who should be allowed to do 
what [12]. This is at the level where, if asked whether person A 
should be allowed to use a resource X, most can answer “yes” or 
“no”, based on their knowledge about the person and rules about 
how the resources should be used. The problem is not, then, that 
resource owners lack knowledge of their access control needs, but 
that they may have difficulty in “programming” them correctly in 
an authorization system [14].  
Moreover, emerging security needs must work in a context very 
different from that for which security paradigms were designed. 
In contrast to a conventional mainframe system, where security 
was essentially under the control of a single system administrator, 
today it is often required to secure resources on a decentralised 
network with no single point of control. Security policies may 
need to account for new parameters, such as the location of a 
requestor [15]. Whilst the concept is easy to understand, the 
parameters are often difficult for resource owners to express in the 
computer security policy language, particularly if, as is most often 
the case, they do not have security expertise [14]. 
2.2 Authorization Reaches Out 
In practical implementation, these emerging paradigms can only 
be made tractable with a clear understanding of the differences 
and interplay between authentication and authorization. 
Authentication is the process of determining and verifying the 
identity of the user (or other actor) making a request, whilst 
authorization is determining whether to grant a user (or other 
actor) a particular form of access to a resource [22]. 
In practice, authorization is far more important than 
authentication, but, perhaps paradoxically, authentication has, to 
date, been studied in more depth. This could be because usable 
and fully-verifiable authentication systems are a prerequisite for 
authorization, which depends upon them in order to function 
correctly. Authorization and authentication are inter-dependent; 
privacy invasions, for example, can result from designers’ (and 
implementers’) inability to foresee how, or by whom, data might 
be used [2]. But authorization presents its own usability issues. In 
this paper, we focus on the usability of the interface for setting the 
authorization or access control policy. 
Traditionally, access control – whether a policy-based model or 
lists on each resource - has not been controlled directly by “end 
users” of the system, but rather by system administrators. 
Increasingly, for example in WebDAV or NTFS security [6], end 
users, as resource owners, are indeed responsible for setting the 
access controls. There is, then, not always such a great distance 
between the people who set access control policies and those who 
are subject to them. This reinforces the observation of Yee [25] 
and others that responsibility for setting and maintaining security 
controls often falls to non-specialists, who are primarily 
concerned with other more immediately pressing tasks. A usable 
way to express access control is essential if it is to be followed 
reliably, but there is the additional danger that users may not fully 
understand the implications of their security actions. 
2.3 Authorization in Grid computing 
Setting access controls in ways which are comprehensible and 
clear for non-specialists is all the more important in the growing 
area of Grid computing. Here, the systems being protected, and 
the applications running on them, are heterogeneous, and include 
very expensive or highly confidential resources. Grids may 
expand to very large computer systems, potentially accessed by 
many users or by other computers. This large, complex network 
of actors, resources, actions, permissions, and constraints leads to 
a correspondingly dynamic and complex security configuration. 
Moreover, because the computers in a Grid are spread across 
administrative domains, a resource owner will usually not grant 
access directly to an individual known to him or her. Conversely, 
with the use of schedulers, a person requesting use of Grid 
resources might not know in advance the particular set of hosts on 
which his or her request will be actioned [16].  
Applying these kinds of complex configurations resembles end-
user programming rather more than it resembles interactions 
which are commonly performed using a GUI. To the extent that 
this is a form of programming, it is a process of transforming a 
conceptual plan “in the head” of the user/programmer in familiar, 
informal terms, into a form which is compatible with a computer. 
There is long-standing empirical research into how non-
programmers “naturally” think about programming [19]. More 
recently, Rode, Rosson, and Quiñones [21] have made a study of 
how non-programmer webmasters think about some common 
processing needs in web applications. They discovered many 
mis-conceptions and unconsidered assumptions; of particular 
relevance to this present research, they found that non-
programmer webmasters can usually devise a simple 
authorization scheme, but it is almost always incomplete. 
2.4 Language and Human Intentions 
The same authors who have pointed out the distance between 
users’ mental plans and the expression of those plans in terms 
which are compatible with a computer have also suggested 
natural-like language as a way to decrease this “distance” and 
increase the “naturalness” [19,21]. Pulman [20] suggested that 
controlled natural language might be a way to enable experts in 
some domain to express their expertise in a way which could 
translated into a portable, computer-readable form. The problem 
of expressing access control policies is similar, but is more 
immediate since information systems are growing rapidly in 
complexity, with consequent access control challenges. 
Natural-ness is not necessarily best achieved by a full natural 
language [19]; controlled natural language is not in any way a 
compromise. Controlled language can be tailored for specific 
uses, such as web service protocol descriptions or the construction 
of ontologies, as has been done by the General Architecture for 
Text Engineering (GATE) team in the Semantic Knowledge 
Technology (SEKT) project1. Significantly, these have compared 
favourably with a GUI-style ontology editor [13]. 
The use of controlled languages has been found elsewhere to be 
highly usable for end-user specification of security and/or privacy 
policies. SPARCLE is designed for natural expression of privacy 
policies [4]. Adage includes a formal logical language alongside a 
GUI for the expression of RBAC policies [26]. However, the 
motivation and approach behind PERMIS is quite specific. We 
have already seen (section 2.3) that Grid computing presents 
particular authorization challenges. PERMIS is designed to 
address these challenges on the basis of RBAC. As the following 
subsection shows, RBAC provides a means to make Grid security 
manageable, but also presents new conceptual difficulties for 
non-specialist users. 
2.5 Challenges in RBAC Policy Specification 
Access control in PERMIS is based on a well understood, unified 
access control model, a variant of RBAC. One of the advantages 
of such an authorization policy is that, unlike access control 
applied at the level of each subject or each target resource (such 
as access control lists or Unix-style read-write-execute), a unified 
policy is therefore more maintainable and more scalable [7]. 
                                                                 
1 http://gate.ac.uk/; http://www.sekt-project.com/ 
As well as providing a solid foundation for security 
implementations, RBAC is applicable to completely general 
situations, rather than being drawn from the privacy or security 
needs of particular application domains. This is one of its strong 
points, but without careful interface design this could place a 
correspondingly greater onus on the resource owner. 
Unfortunately, it has been found that resource owners generally 
are not familiar with RBAC, and consequently have a partial 
understanding of “what-needs-to-be-done” [5] to implement 
access control; this would lead to policies which are incomplete 
or which contain unnecessary elements. In particular, Brostoff, 
Sasse, Chadwick, Cunningham, Mbanaso & Otenko [5] identified 
two classes of problems which they labelled the “policy 
components” and “policy paradigms” problems.By “policy 
components problem”, they mean that resource owners do not 
understand some of the basic structure of the PERMIS RBAC 
policy space, such as Subject Domains (the domains from which 
users can be allowed to access resources) and role assignments 
around Source of Authority (SOA) or domain administrators. 
By “policy paradigm problem”, they mean that resource owners 
are unsure which objects should be included in a policy, and 
which left out, if they follow the mental model of traditional 
access control such as “explicitly grant and explicitly deny 
access”. Because PERMIS RBAC policies exclude by default all 
permissions which are not explicitly granted (the deny all access 
except model), policies are likely to be inefficient rather than non-
functioning or insecure, or might unnecessarily deny access to 
groups of users who should have access but who were not 
mentioned in the policy. Nevertheless, there is a risk of 
unintended outcomes whenever a resource owner does not 
understand a key aspect of policy specification. 
There are, then, two sources of risk arising from mistakes in 
setting access control policies. Mistakes can be due to the 
complexity of the policy, with a consequent likelihood of 
omissions, ambiguities or inconsistencies [8]. There can also be 
mistakes which follow from a basic mis-understanding of the 
underlying security model, as Brostoff et al. identified [5]. These 
new classes of “programming” error do not, of course, diminish 
the possibility of simple “slips”, lapses or spelling errors, which 
also have to be eliminated if the policy is to function as the user 
intends. 
For the reasons we discussed above, we believe that constrained 
natural language can overcome problems for users of knowing 
“what-needs-to-be-done” and can enable “slips” to be easily 
detected. At the same time, once conceptual shortcomings have 
been addressed, users still need to be supported to know how to 
use the interface to express their policy. The challenge for us, 
then, was to allow resource owners to express policies without 
requiring them to have any specialist knowledge of RBAC or 
access control models, and to design an interface which is usable 
in this more conventional HCI sense. 
3. EASY EXPRESSION OF 
AUTHORISATION POLICIES 
This was the point of departure for the Easy Expression of 
Authorisation Policies (EEAP) project. As part of the PERMIS 
infrastructure, EEAP is particularly concerned with security 
issues in e-Science, Grid computing, and web services generally. 
3.1 The Virtuous Circle of Authorization 
Policy Specification 
The fundamental idea underlying EEAP is the virtuous circle of 
expressing authorization policies, a concept developed 
particularly to support resource owners in Grid computing 
throughout the entire process of policy specification [8]. The 
virtuous circle is based on the realisation that language stands in a 
special relationship to human understanding. GUI visualisations, 
from this viewpoint, are complementary to natural language, 
rather than being the only means of reporting the meaning of 
access control policies. The user can choose either, or can switch 
between the two, so that checking is completely available for both 
visual and linguistic cognition. 
We started the project with the natural language output for the 
virtuous circle already in place, as part of the PERMIS Editor 
GUI. Policies expressed using the GUI or a Wizard, are 
transformed into machine-processable form in XML according to 
the PERMIS DTD [7]. The XML is then transformed (using an 
XSL stylesheet) back to the user as natural language. The final 
policy is therefore available to the user in three forms: raw XML, 
the familiar GUI screens, and the natural language output. 
Crucially, the natural language display also shows diagnostic 
error and warning messages, a point to which we shall return 
later. Because the output, in whichever form they prefer, is 
generated directly from the computer-readable form of the policy, 
the user can be confident that it reflects the authorization that will 
actually be enforced by the system. 
In a paper published at the beginning of the PERMIS Natural 
Language development, Chadwick & Sasse [8] assumed that 
completing the virtuous circle by enabling the use of controlled 
natural language input of security policies as well as for their 
display would greatly reduce the scope for misconceptions of the 
sort discussed in the previous section, and would enable “slips” to 
be more easily detected. However, at that early stage, this 
remained to be investigated empirically. In this paper, we revisit 
these assertions, in the light of our experiences with applying 
these ideas in practice. 
3.2 Grid Security in the Wild 
The process of developing a natural language input for the 
PERMIS Editor began by interviewing 45 e-science practitioners 
across the range of e-science application areas: the hard sciences, 
medical research and bioinformatics, earth sciences, and arts and 
humanities. Interviews were semi-structured, with an average 
length of about 45 minutes. They were voice-recorded for 
transcription using Grounded Theory [10]. 18 participants were 
interviewed individually and the others in small focus groups (2-4 
participants). 
This first phase of the research had three main purposes: 
1. To understand the major requirements in Grid security, and 
how they are expressed by Grid resource owners; 
2. To inform the design of the ontology which underlies 
PERMIS access control policies and is the first stage of 
natural language processing; and 
3. To inform suitable scenarios for the later evaluation of the 
natural language interface. 
3.2.1 Grid Security: Varied Uses, Complex Needs 
From the interviews, it was evident that Grid security policies are 
hard to specify, not only because access control is not well 
understood by resource owners, but because real-world situations 
are complex and changeable. 
Grid computing has varied and sometimes incompatible 
requirements: access to large volumes of data, fine-grained access 
control, making specialised data or software widely available to 
the research community, providing very high-powered computer 
processing, and maintaining the confidentiality of data. Data 
integrity is always important, but especially where data volumes 
are very large. In some areas, for example some kinds of 
humanities data, there are commercial considerations; data may 
be restricted because it has gained a high commercial value in 
electronic form, even if it is public data. Conversely, the 
availability of electronic images of artefacts such as rare 
documents may remove restrictions imposed by the physical 
vulnerability of the originals. 
3.2.2 R-what? Implications for Ontology design 
We already knew that knowledge of RBAC is not widespread 
among Grid users, apart from security specialists. The findings 
from the interviews re-enforce this, but, in the absence of easily 
specified security policies which fit their needs, resource owners 
are adopting simpler, all-or-nothing policies. 
The means for expressing and maintaining access control policies 
must be flexible enough to handle very different needs in different 
applications, while remaining comprehensible by the intended 
users. Our original intention was to extract security terms (words 
and phrases), synonyms, and antonyms, and relate them to the 
model formalized in the ontology. However, our findings from 
this first phase suggested the need to keep the ontology as general 
as possible by defining only the basic classes and sub-classes, 
avoiding application-specific instances. 
3.3 Putting the Virtuous Circle into Practice 
Underpinned by our ontology, the last link in the chain of a 
virtuous circle of authorization policies has been now put in 
place: the Policy Editor supports controlled natural language [20] 
input of the most essential features of the RBAC model. It is now 
possible to express an access control policy in controlled natural 
language, to have this transformed in to XML, and for this to be 
re-presented back to the user as a diagnostic display, in natural 
language or another form of his or her choice. However, the 
parser does not yet include the full functionality of the PERMIS 
RBAC specification. 
The constrained natural language interface provides a simple 
layout. On the left-hand side, the user types sentences, each of 
which represents a rule in the natural language form of the policy. 
These sentences do not have to correspond to sections of the final 
computer-readable policy, but are in any order which makes sense 
to the user. Indeed, rules can be combined using comma-separated 
lists: 
Manager, owner, and clerk are roles. 
Managers and owners can print on LPT1 and HP Laserjet. 
The space for entry of the natural language text is a simple editor, 
with functions such as cut/copy and paste and insert or over-write, 
and shortcuts Ctrl+X, Ctrl+V, Ctrl+C (Figure 1). The right-hand 
side of the same window shows an example of a policy in 
constrained natural language. This is a key part of the interface; 
resource owners should be able to express security policies guided 
by a few example rules and only minimal other guidance. 
 
Figure 1: The controlled natural language interface 
3.4 PERMIS Controlled Natural Language 
It is important to understand that this is controlled natural 
language processing. We have already shown that it is 
natural-ness, not natural language in itself, which is of interest as 
a means of reducing the distance between users’ intentions and 
their formal expression. From the implementation point of view, 
natural language is ambiguous and complex, and consequently 
very hard to process and translate by machines, and such tools 
that do exist are usually not freely available. Controlled natural 
language, in contrast, provides a strictly limited vocabulary and/or 
grammar. This makes machine processing much easier [8], while 
still being tailored to the specific requirements of the interface. 
Our natural language processor has made use of a GATE 
implementation, Controlled Language for Ontology Editing 
(CLOnE), itself built on earlier work of the GATE team, 
Controlled Language for Information Extractions (CLIE). Details 
of the ten syntactic rules of CLOnE are given in [13]. 
In effect, specifying an authorization policy is very similar to 
defining an ontology. The critical point, though, is that this is 
transparent to the user. 
3.4.1 The Controlled Natural Language Interface 
Some powerful usability features of CLOnE have been carried 
over into our natural language interface. For example, the parser 
can identify matching nouns differing in singularity or plurality, 
and can handle irregular forms or non-English loan words (“There 
are Children. Xavier is a child”). This feature is further enhanced 
in our implementation, which is more lax than natural English in 
terms of grammatical agreement of singular or plural of subject 
and verb (“supervisors and office staff are an employee” is 
acceptable even though it is incorrect English).  
In our constrained natural language, we have extended CLOnE in 
four respects which pertain specifically to authorization policies: 
1. A simple way, using triples, to allocate permissions to roles: 
<Role> can <Action> on <Target>; for example, “Staff can 
print on HP Laserjet 1.”; 
2. Linking the special “can assign” permissions to role/attribute 
administrators: <Admin> can assign the <Role> to 
<Subject>; for example, “David can assign the manager role 
to Alice.”, or “John can assign the clerk role to users from 
department A.”; 
3. Using “trust” as a variation of 2) in “I trust <Administrator> 
to say who <Role> are; for example, “I trust David to say 
who managers are.”; 
4. Conditions to constrain a permission: <Subject> can 
<Action> on <Target> if <Condition>; for example, “Staff 
can print on HP Laserjet 1 if copies is less than 10.” 
New rule 4) is only partially implemented in the current early 
version of the language parser and so it did not feature in the 
evaluations. 
3.4.2 Classes and Instances: New Entities from Old 
Grouping of types within categories is a suggestion of Karat et al. 
[17] as a means to overcome scaling issues. Our natural language 
parser provides two useful grouping features, which allow users to 
refer concisely to properties which apply to the whole group. 
When an entity class is created, a special pseudo-instance is 
automatically created at the first time, called “all_<class>” (eg. 
“all_Printer”). This can be used later to define properties of every 
object of that type (every instance of the class). For example, 
There are printers. 
Managers can print on [all] printers. 
A related feature, native to CLOnE, is that entities can be created 
as a “type of” some already existing entity (as a sub-class of a 
class). The sub-class inherits the properties of the super-class; for 
example, a type of resource inherits the actions property. 
3.4.3 Language is Parsed in Context 
This ability to create new types of entity from existing ones is 
used in PERMIS so that the process of specifying a policy does 
not start from an empty ontology, but builds on a small set of 
hidden and pre-defined classes and relationships. The user is, in 
effect, creating instances of classes and defining new classes from 
existing ones, but is unaware of the inbuilt definitions. This 
means that the sentences written by users are parsed in the context 
of an access control policy for which the outline is already pre-
loaded. 
This context is also in the form of natural language with exactly 
the same syntax: 
There are users, roles, resources, actions, parameters 
and permissions. 
Resources are also called targets. 
Users have roles. 
Roles have permissions. 
Permissions have resources and actions. 
Resources have actions. 
… 
These rules, which describe the underlying RBAC model, are 
loaded and parsed before any user input, to build an ontology 
model with pre-defined classes and relationships from the 
authors’ background knowledge of RBAC and PERMIS. 
This background context removes from the user the burden of 
defining from scratch the ontology of the RBAC model. But a 
more important purpose of the context is to align the security 
model in user’s mind with the RBAC model used in the computer 
system. There might be a different model in their mind; by 
providing a pre-defined RBAC model of Roles, Permissions, and 
other elements, the user is enabled to specify a policy in these 
terms and with their own variations, which can then be exported 
to the final computer-readable format. 
It is important to emphasise that users are not expected to know, 
or to need to know, anything about the underlying ontology, 
RBAC model, or rulesets; we discuss these here only to clarify 
the connection between natural language and the final policy 
expression. Classes, properties, pre-defined elements, and the 
relationships between them, and from them to the final policy, are 
transparent to the users; they need only to learn a few simple rules 
and follow the example text. 
4. EVALUATION 
In the first phase of the research we interviewed a wide selection 
of e-science users and administrators, used this as the basis for 
requirements and for enhancements to the ontology design, and 
implemented a controlled natural language interface to reflect the 
requirements and the ontology. We now turn to the evaluation of 
our interface. 
From the review of previous research and our beliefs outlined 
above, we derived four research questions: 
1. Overall usability: can target users understand the syntax of 
the controlled natural language, using the example? 
2. Can target users understand the “building blocks” of a 
PERMIS policy (resources, actions, roles, and administrator 
and role assignments)? 
3. Can target users avoid misconceptions in the 
RBAC/PERMIS model when using the PERMIS natural 
language editor?  
And, finally, the overall question: 
4. Using controlled natural language, with the simple examples 
provided, are target users able to specify policies accurately, 
reflecting their real-world intentions? 
This is a quite specific understanding of usability, tailored to the 
needs of access control specification. At this stage, we did not 
attempt to measure other aspects of usability, such as subjective 
satisfaction or efficiency. We chose a scenario-based approach, 
recorded and observed in a controlled environment. 
The first scenario (Figure 2) was designed to reflect common 
real-world access control needs without making reference to any 
particular field of application. Where time allowed this was 
followed by a more complex scenario; for participants with prior 
e-science experience, this second scenario was drawn from their 
field of work, based on the interviews conducted in phase one; for 
others, the second scenario was a variant of the first. 
These scenarios were quite specific in terms of access control, but 
in a form which could not be simply entered verbatim into the 
natural language processor. In taking this approach, we assume 
that real-world users know what they want to control; our interest 
is in their ability to express their intentions. This requires a 
careful methodological balance between the need to be clear 
about what the policy should say, and the risk of simply giving 
users a set of words they can copy. 
4.1.1 Participants 
Seventeen participants were recruited in three complementary 
ways: using internal email lists; a request to IT-related staff 
working internally in the college library; and from a database of 
e-scientists built up during earlier phases of the research. 
Target users are e-scientists (researchers with knowledge of their 
research domain and some understanding of Grid computing), 
senior research management (Principal Investigators) and 
administrators (possibly departmental administrators or 
information systems staff). Although they have good computer 
skills, they are not computer security specialists. All of the 
participants were fluent in written and spoken English, although 
not all had English as a first language. 
All 17 participants were from our target group of users; all were 
highly computer-literate and working in a variety of computer-
related areas. They are target users, even though not all of the 
participants had specific e-Science experience. This reflects likely 
usage in the real world, where security policy authoring is often 
handled by team members who are not e-science or security 
specialists. 
Participants included 7 e-science researchers in Earth Sciences, 
Medical, Crystallography/Chemistry, Physics, and Arts & 
Humanities; and 10 participants without specific e-Science 
experience, of whom 4 were computer science researchers and 6 
library computer professionals (web and database administrators, 
project managers). 
4.1.2 Conducting the observations 
We already know that resource owners, as non-security 
specialists, usually do not have any formal understanding of 
access control models, particularly RBAC [5]. However, we 
believe it is realistic to expect that resource owners would have 
informal knowledge of basic access control concepts, perhaps 
from the PERMIS Editor tutorial which new users are encouraged 
to follow. To ensure that these basic ideas were understood, rather 
than asking participants to complete the tutorial we prepared a 
short (1 page) description of the basic RBAC concepts. 
This was read to them by the experimenter, rather than asking 
participants to read it for themselves; this was to overcome 
different abilities in grasping written information and to allow the 
experimenter to check understanding at key points. 
Each participant was then given, in printed form, the first scenario 
presented in two formats, as a simple written list of requirements 
and in diagrammatic form (Figure 2). 
To reflect what we believe to be the common point from which 
policy authoring starts, we presented participants with scenarios 
as both words and a diagram. We hoped the participants would 
work mainly from the diagram. However, we found that in 
practice, they mostly ignored the diagram and worked from the 
verbal description; in future, we would use diagram-only for 
similar scenarios. 
Participants were told that they could take as much time, and as 
many attempts as they needed to complete a scenario and to 
produce a working access control policy. (In practice, with two 
exceptions, the sessions were limited to one hour.) Two general 
scenarios were prepared without any reference to a specific 
application area. We aimed to avoid any real-world references, to 
avoid participants making assumptions about levels of seniority or 
other aspects. 
The first, simpler, scenario contained three roles, three resources 
with three possible actions on them, and one administrator. The 
second scenario was only a little more complex, adding the 
concept of users’ domains. The scenarios were phrased to include 
concepts which are not normally expressed directly in RBAC: 
access denials; access to “all” instances of a resource type; and 
“groupings” – different elements which are specified as being of a 
type, as well as “background” elements such as a database 
containing the resources. 
Interactions, every action on the screen, keyboard and mouse, as 
well as voice, were recorded using Camtasia Studio2. We did not 
use a formal think-aloud protocol because this can be distracting, 
                                                                 
2 http://www.techsmith.com/camtasia.asp 
but we did encourage participants to make comments, and 
occasionally the experimenter would ask a participant to explain 
an action. These comments and questions were noted during 
analysis and form a valuable input to the results. 
4.1.3 Analysing the Observation Data 
The analysis proceeded as follows. Each of the recordings was 
replayed as many times as necessary, with the analyst noting in a 
spreadsheet the times at which key events occurred, and each time 
the participant clicked “Convert”; this is considered to be a “try”.  
Measured times include the time taken for the participant to read 
the scenario, but not the time taken for the observer to read out 
the background description of basic RBAC concepts. We call this 
the elapsed time since “handover”, the point at which the observer 
finished reading the introduction and RBAC overview and 
explicitly made clear to the participant that the observation was 
now under way. 
We expected the participants to continue until a workable policy 
was produced, within the time constraint of one hour overall. 
Therefore, rather than a metric for scoring rules, our measure of 
the accuracy of policy specification is the number of “tries” made 
by each participant. This needs to be considered in conjunction 
with the overall time, since some participants chose to correct 
errors themselves, before clicking “Convert”. 
At the same time as recording the timings and number of “tries”, 
the analyst noted significant questions and comments by the 
participants, used in the qualitative analysis which follows. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Overall results 
Overall the results are encouraging: all 17 participants grasped the 
basic concept of expressing policies in controlled language 
without difficulty. The time taken and number of attempts to 
produce a complete working policy in the first scenario was 
higher than we would like in real use (average 35:45 minutes and 
6.6 tries), but we expect that this will fall as users learn the simple 
grammar of the constrained language, and as they re-use and 
amend existing “scripts”. 
We now address in more detail the questions raised at the 
beginning of section 4.  
5.2 Usability of Controlled Natural Language 
The constrained vocabulary and the names of objects in the 
predefined ontology (resources, actions, roles, permissions) are 
well understood. Participants did not need to understand the 
relation between verbs such as “can” or “assign” and the creation 
of entities in the ontology in order to specify workable policies. 
Some participants considered the language almost as a “script”, 
using that term in feedback to the observer. 
5.2.1 Usability of the Editing Space 
Our first concern in overall usability was that presenting 
participants with an almost empty space on which to type, with 
minimal editing controls and only an example text as a guide, 
might be daunting.  










Clerks can add and 
change Name, date 






can read it 
all 
However, this does not appear to have been a problem for our 
participants. Measured as the time taken between the “handover” 
of the session and the participant starting to type on the text 
editing space, this was average of 4:20 minutes. We believe that 
this is a sufficiently short time, including the time to read the 
instructions and scenario, to indicate that participants were not 
daunted by the emptiness of the screen. 
The majority (15 of 17) of the participants were able to specify an 
accurate, workable access control policy for at least the simple 
scenario within 45 minutes and 10 tries. Excluding the two 
outliers, mean times for completion of the first scenario fall to 
26:45 minutes in 5.125 tries. 
We hope that the overall times will fall as target users learn the 
requirements of our constrained natural language. There is some 
evidence to support this. Of the 7 non-specialist participants who 
proceeded to the second, slightly more advanced, scenario, the 
mean time was 12:36 minutes in 2.5 tries, significantly better than 
the first. However, note that this second scenario was conducted 
immediately after the first, and was very similar, adding only two 
additional user administrative domains. 
5.2.2 Usability in Specifying Policy Elements 
It is clear from the detailed timings that some task elements are 
more readily understood than others. Adding the three roles, 
Clerk, Owner, and Analyst seems to have caused little problem. 
Similarly, almost all participants managed to say “John is an 
administrator.” on the first attempt. 
There is a specific issue which caused some problems; this relates 
to accuracy, and is also a part of the general usability of the 
interface. This follows a design feature of the controlled 
language: it is strict with regard to the pre-definition of entities. 
References to entities do not cause that entity to be created; if it 
has not been defined earlier in the policy, then this is an error. 
This is by design; it applies to all entities – resources, resource 
types, roles, actions, users, and permissions; the aim is to prevent 
mistakes introduced by typing errors. For example 
Clerk can read databsae” 
will be reported as an error, rather than creating an incorrect 
resource instance “databsae”. However, this does, naturally, add 
to users’ workload by requiring that each instance must be 
explicitly defined before it can be referenced. 
5.2.3 A Parsing Problem: Prepositions 
The quantitative data does not show why some of the rules proved 
difficult to specify. But analysis of the qualitative data shows one 
of the most common problems: forgetting to add prepositions 
between verbs and the corresponding object:  
Owners can read Name. 
instead of 
Owners can read from Name. 
It might be expected that this would be more of a problem where 
the verb usually does not require a preposition in natural English 
than with other verbs, but our observations do not support this. 
Part of the scenario required a combination of write/add/change – 
the scenario said: 
Clerks can add and change Name, date of 
birth, Address and Postcode 
- given like this, without prepositions. Change and add do not 
normally have prepositions, so the parser requires some slightly 
“un-natural” English such as “Clerks can change on Name ...”. 
The need for prepositions is a feature of the parser which would 
require a deep re-design to change; the appropriate design 
response is to guide users to follow it correctly. This is not a 
fundamental issue in the gap between users’ intentions and their 
expressions of them in language. The problems found here are, 
however, suggestive of the ways in which participants make use 
of the example text. As we describe in the following subsection, a 
more critical incident led us to change the text slightly, to remove 
a more fundamental problem. 
5.2.4 The Importance of the Example 
An early version of the example text showed a sentence 
specifying a parameter for an action: 
Print has Pagenum 
That is, the print action can take a pagenum parameter. 
One participant attempted to specify a policy in which the 
resources to be acted upon were given as parameters to the action, 
for example: 
Write with Address. 
where Address is a parameter of the Write action. Superficially, 
this seems reasonable, since actions can have parameters; 
however, in our ontology it is not possible to restrict access 
according to the parameters to an action – properties apply to 
classes/subclasses and their instances, that is, to objects, not 
parameters. 
This line in the example text was removed from the example text 
for later trials, and, not surprisingly, no further participants 
attempted to express the policy in this way. Our point here is not 
that using parameters is or should be incorporated into the 
ontology as a way to control access; the point is that this incident 
throws light on the use made by participants of the example text. 
However, in a later subsection we give a contrasting example. 
5.3 Specifying Policies in Terms of the 
Ontology Elements 
We found that participants had little difficulty in understanding 
the basic elements, the pre-defined entities which are the 
“building blocks” of an RBAC policy: roles, actions, and 
resources. This in itself is a positive result, since RBAC revolves 
around these concepts, which are unfamiliar, as access control 
elements, to most of our participants. 
We did, however, identify two common classes of problem in the 
use of these pre-defined building blocks. These both concern 
users’ conception of elements of the underlying ontology, and so 
present a design question about how best to guide users, without 
explicitly exposing the design of the ontology. 
5.3.1 Understanding the policy “building blocks” 
Participants should not have to know about the pre-defined 
entities (ontology classes – see section 3.4.3), which are the 
“building blocks” of an access control policy. However, they do 
need to understand that, although they are free to define the 
names of new entities (classes and instances), these new entities 
must be defined in terms of the existing entities. 
For example, in order to say “dirac is a computer”, it is necessary 
for “computer” to be previously defined as a class, or, more 
workably, as a sub-class of resource: 
Computers are a type of resource. 
Dirac is a computer. 
Some participants attempted to use this approach to define records 
or fields in the database as instances, but defined them instead as 
a type of resource, that is, as a subclass in the ontology, rather 
than as instances: 
Postcode is a type of resource. 
instead of 
Postcode is a resource. 
This could point to a more fundamental problem, which is that 
users do not appreciate the difference between classes and 
instances, which can be and often are used interchangeably. For 
example, in a different access control policy, Postcode might be 
a class; AA1 1BQ could be an instance of this class. This point is 
further illustrated in the next subsection. 
5.3.2 Aggregating Elements at too High a Level 
The “grouping” feature of our natural language, described in 
section 3.4.2, is a powerful tool for users but also presents users 
with the possibility of unproductive choices. In the scenario, 
fields which are the subject of access control are said to be within 
a database. This is best considered as “background”, not specified 
in the policy; it is the object to which the policy as a whole 
applies. 
Several participants attempted to define the database as the basic 
resource. This approach does not lead to a workable access 
control policy. Although grouping is suitable for entities which 
share common properties, the level of grouping needs to be 
sufficiently fine-grained that some useful statements can be made 
about the commonalities. If the boundaries are too broad, then 
users may find that they give away more authority than they 
intend. 
Conceptually, we believe that both of these cases suggest that 
users are confused by the subtle distinction between objects which 
are naturally understood as one object (one instance), and objects 
which actually represent many objects (which could be classes or 
instances, depending on the circumstances). Example of the 
former: one named computer (eg. “Dirac”), a database, a piece of  
hardware. Example of the latter: a set of records, fields in a 
database. Each of the latter has many (unquantified) instances, but 
in access control terms, permissions are (implicitly) to the set of 
objects. Yet in the controlled language, this set of objects must be 
specified as an instance, since permissions are on instances and 
not on types (classes), which are regarded as being empty in the 
ontology. To handle this, we introduced all_instances (section 
3.4.2): actions can be given to all instances of a resource class. 
The question of how to bridge the subtle distinction between 
classes and instances for non-specialists raises difficult usability 
issues and requires further study. 
5.4 Overcoming Misconceptions 
The third question concerns the usability of controlled natural 
language in overcoming users’ misconceptions about the access 
control model 
Notably, the participants showed no confusions around the target 
domain/subject domain distinction which was a source of 
misconception for Brostoff et al [5] (the first aspect of their policy 
components problem); it becomes intuitively obvious that 
DepartmentA is the domain from which requests originate, the 
subject domain, in statements such as: 
John can assign Analyst to users from DepartmentA. 
This is despite some problems in practical application; the syntax 
at this point is strict, and spaces in particular seem to cause 
problems. 
However, concerning another point of misconception identified 
by Brostoff et al. [5], the function of domain administrators and 
the separation of roles from end-users, the evidence is less clear. 
5.4.1 Understanding Roles and Assignments 
This second aspect of policy components concerns the special 
Role Assignment Permission, and the associated action 
“<administrator> can assign <role> to users [from <domain>]”. 
Many participants attempted to express administrators in terms of 
normal roles and actions; but roles and users are different from 
resources, and assignment of users to roles cannot be expressed in 
these terms. 
Fundamentally this suggests that users have not understood the 
difference between RBAC user-role assignment (which are 
normally done by an administrator) and RBAC role-permission 
assignments (which are the access control part of the policy).  
This is a likely explanation for the observation that participants 
made this mistake even though the example text gave two clear 
examples of user-role assignment sentences. This disparity 
suggests that the example text is not followed closely. However, 
the observation discussed in section 5.2.4 suggests otherwise. 
Although there was only a single occurrence early in the trials, the 
difference between the two cases is striking. It suggests that an 
example text, no matter how well-written, is unlikely to solve all 
of the users’ conceptual difficulties. 
5.4.2 Deny-all-access-except 
Another point at which the requirements of PERMIS RBAC 
diverge from the intuitive expectations of non-specialist users is 
that, in PERMIS RBAC, the inbuilt default permission is 
effectively “deny-all-except”; exclusions do not, therefore, need 
to be explicitly stated, unless it is to reduce the scope of a 
permission already granted (Brostoff et al’s [5] policy paradigm 
problem). 
To investigate this, we had taken care to include some exclusions 
in the scenarios: 
Owners cannot change any data but can read it all 
However, in contrast with Brostoff et al.’s [5] findings using the 
GUI, none of our participants attempted to express this using an 
“exclude” clause; a few asked about it, verbally during the trials, 
but only for clarification, rather than as a conceptual difficulty. 
This very positive result suggests that natural language has the 
potential to overcome conceptual problems which are intractable 
using more traditional interfaces. 
5.5 Analysis 
At the end of this subsection we revisit the usability needs which 
led us to explore the potential of controlled natural language. 
Before doing so, however, we draw a wider lesson from the 
results which relate to basic questions in HCI. 
5.5.1 Abstraction: What Do They Need to Know? 
One of the basic aims of using controlled natural language is that 
users should be able to specify policies by following examples, 
with a short learning curve and minimal other guidance [20]. Our 
investigation asks to what extent this has been achieved in the 
specific case of the specification of access control policies. 
We started from the belief that our target users are “experts” in 
the access control requirements of the resources under their 
control. In this research, we found that evaluation participants can 
follow the PERMIS Policy Editor “dialect” of controlled natural 
language without difficulty. However, we also found that they 
needed to know something about the pre-defined “building 
blocks”, while at the same time we have been concerned that they 
should not have to understand the underlying complexities of the 
RBAC ontology. 
In sections 5.2.4 and 5.4.1, we provided two contrasting 
examples: in one, participants followed their own partial 
understanding based on previous experience, while in the other a 
participant followed the text example in a way which turned out 
not to be helpful. 
The point here is that contents, as well as the phrasing, of the 
information provided to users are crucial. The example content 
should naturally lead resource owners to express policies in 
keeping with the underlying access control model. Yet it should 
always be possible for a resource owner to express a policy by 
adapting lines from the example text. Seen in this way, the writing 
of the example text is a question of abstraction. We agree with 
Witten & Tygar [24] that computer security management, like 
more conventional programming, is a process of manipulation of 
abstract rules, and consequently alien and unintuitive for non-
programmers. However, abstraction is also the means by which 
complexity is made manageable [11]. In preparing the example 
text, the writer/designer is deciding to selectively hide or reveal 
specific complexities of the underlying system.  
5.5.2 Revisiting the Problem 
We are now in a position to revisit the usability issues which we 
identified in section 2.5. Recall that we were concerned with risks 
in access control specification arising from uncertainty about 
“what needs to be done” [5]. We summarise these as 
misconceptions: security policies are difficult to understand; and 
complexities: the size of the system being controlled makes it 
difficult to ensure completeness. The user also needs to 
understand how to do what needs to be done. The interface 
therefore needs to guide a user to produce policies which are 
accurate, complete, and do not contain security vulnerabilities, 
and do so this in a way which is intuitive or is available for the 
user to discover from examples. 
In terms of misconceptions, our evidence suggests that controlled 
natural language can reduce the risk and bypass some of the 
problems found with the GUI interface. In some aspects, such as 
excluding all permissions by default and being clear about the 
distinction between subjects (“end users”) and targets (resources), 
it seems reasonable to believe that the logic of the user is 
intuitively closer to the model when expressing policies in natural 
language than when using the GUI. On the other hand, not all of 
the elements of Brostoff et al’s [5] policy components problem 
and policy paradigm problems are overcome: the distinction 
between assignments of users to roles and assignment of 
permissions to roles is still not intuitively understood. Nor is the 
difference between classes of objects and instances of objects. 
A second class of error arises not from misconceptions but from 
simple “slips” or lapses [8]. In section 5.2.2, we describe the 
common problem of participants forgetting to pre-specify policy 
objects, or of being unaware of the need to do so. Yet, as we 
noted above, this “problem” is also a powerful means to 
overcome simple errors; it is immediately clear to a user that a 
mistake has been made. With better feedback, the small problem 
would be easily overcome, while a larger risk, that of accidentally 
mis-specifying a policy, is avoided. 
In terms of knowing how to do it, we feel that the times and 
numbers of “tries”, both overall and for the individual task 
elements, suggest that controlled natural language allows users to 
specify accurate and complete policies easily and in a reasonable 
time. The syntax of the controlled language corresponds well to 
users’ “natural” way of thinking [19] at least in the most basic 
elements of access control policies: who can perform which 
actions on which resources. However, there were some common 
problems which, although ostensibly simple “mistakes”, may 
reflect underlying conceptual difficulties. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the results of the study, constrained natural language is 
a promising avenue to enable resource owners in Grid computing 
to express their access control needs more easily. Overall, it 
provides a usable interface, but some conceptual and usability 
issues remain. We do not believe that these are insurmountable. 
We conclude with some pointers, drawn from the results 
presented here, for ways in which future work can address these 
issues, and some features which remain to be implemented in our 
controlled language parser. 
6.1 Informing the User 
In our analysis (section 5.5.1), we find that designing an interface 
which supports the user in the cognitive tasks of specifying access 
control policies, without requiring specialist expertise, is at root a 
question of abstraction, of ensuring that the user knows enough to 
avoid mistakes, without becoming overcome by the complexities 
of the system [24]. In these concluding paragraphs, we move 
beyond “what does the user need to know”, to consider “how does 
the user know what they need to know?”. 
The first point of reference which gives guidance to the user is the 
example text (Figure 1). By design, this text makes no reference 
to any particular access control context so as to be generally 
applicable. An obvious response would be to change the design to 
one in which the example text varies in context. However, this 
would add complexities of its own and possibly be more 
confusing for a user. A possible solution would give multiple 
“typical” examples for different application areas, displayed in 
tabs; the user would choose the most appropriate example. 
The basic problem is to enable the user to understand what is 
happening when they specify access control polices; if there are 
rules that fail to parse, the user needs to be able to understand 
why. Dourish & Button [11] have pointed out that, unlike the real 
world, computational abstractions are not available to be “pushed 
and prodded” and explored; a static text, by its nature 
unresponsive and unchanging, exemplifies this problem, but our 
observations suggest a solution. 
In a more dynamic way than the example text, the language parser 
could provide specific feedback to a user. The diagnostic log as 
currently implemented is only likely to be of interest to a 
developer. For users, it functions more like a progress bar 
informing them that processing is still in progress; it provides 
reassurance that the NLP is not hanging or crashing. However, 
this log also provides the basis for more useable feedback; several 
participants drew a comparison with compilers, which provide a 
comprehensive error report for the benefit of the programmer. It 
would be helpful if the log could switch between developer mode 
and user mode. Feedback provided appropriately in this way 
would immediately overcome the more basic problems, such as 
that of missing prepositions (section 5.2.3). 
6.1.1 Return to the Virtuous Circle 
Feedback is not, however, limited to diagnostic output from the 
language parser. This returns us to the virtuous circle of policy 
specification. We started from the premise that natural language 
output enables the user to check that the machine’s understanding 
of a policy matches with what is intended [8]. With the 
implementation of controlled natural language input, the virtuous 
circle is complete. 
The diagnostic messages in the natural language output are a key 
part of helping the user to understand; but the natural language 
should not be seen as separate from the other interfaces of the 
PERMIS Policy Editor. During the evaluation, we observed that 
the existing GUI interface, which we had considered to be a 
separate part of the PERMIS Editor, was used by participants to 
understand which parts of their policies had been successfully 
specified and which had failed. In future work, we plan to link the 
GUI more closely with the natural language editor, so that 
modifications made in the GUI are reflected in the natural 
language text, just as natural language text is already reflected in 
the GUI. Real-life users also have the availability of the PERMIS 
Policy Tester, although this did not form part of our evaluations. 
Thus, as they came to understand the rationality not only of the 
natural language parser, but of the PERMIS access control system 
as a whole, participants made use of the interplay between each of 
the various interfaces to the PERMIS Editor. 
The virtuous circle, then, can be re-conceived to extend to the 
PERMIS system as a whole. The specification of policies, like 
programming, is an iterative process, in which the user is 
informed by an assemblage of interfaces, working together to 
ensure accurate and easy expression of authorization policies. 
6.2 Remaining issues 
6.2.1 Other Access Control 
PERMIS is specifically concerned with authorization, but must 
work alongside other access control mechanisms, such as 
firewalls and database-level security. 
In addition, there are Grid access control requirements that are 
difficult to implement using RBAC. From our interviews, we 
noted fine grained-ness and flexibility as core requirements. To 
support real-world requirements, the variant of RBAC defined by 
PERMIS supports not only the ANSI standard RBAC features of 
role hierarchies and dynamic and static separation of duties3, but 
also includes enhancements to allow policies to specify other 
constraints (such as time of day), the use of non-role attributes 
such as Level of Assurance4 and delegation of authority. 
However, at the current time, only role hierarchies, non-role 
attributes, conditions, and action parameters are expressible in the 
constrained natural language. 
6.2.2 Unique Names in Grid: LDAP 
A pre-condition of Grid authorization, and of Grid security as a 
whole, is that users are uniquely identified, at least within the 
scope of a Grid [16]. In PERMIS, as elsewhere, this is typically 
implemented by having items in the policy referred to by 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)5 distinguished 
names (DNs). 
Brostoff et al [5] found that, while the need for unique names is 
intuitively understood by target users, they are usually not able to 
correctly specify LDAP DNs; nor should they have to, since the 
use of LDAP implies that there is a repository which can be 
searched or browsed for entries. 
The GUI part of the PERMIS Editor provides the ability to 
connect and browse in an LDAP repository. Currently, the 
controlled language interface does not have any LDAP support, 
since LDAP is not a part of natural language; users have to 
browse LDAP via the GUI after they have finished inputting their 
natural language policy. The natural language output issues 
warnings that a unique name cannot be found, prompting them to 
do this. Implementing direct support for LDAP in the language 
interface will require changes which could also increase the basic 
usability of the Editor; for example, drop-down menus or hyper-
links from which a user could browse an LDAP directory. 
                                                                 
3 ANSI INCITS 359-2004 available at: http://webstore.ansi.org/ 




6.2.3 PERMIS Natural Language in Use 
How will people use it? From remarks made by participants 
during the evaluations and from our interviews and focus groups, 
we suggest that in real life, people will maintain “scripts” which 
can be loaded into the natural language interface and amended as 
needed. If this is correct, then our natural language interface 
might prove more supportive of maintainability and scalability in 
Grid access control than the existing GUI interfaces.  
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